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l The Importance of Private Actors in the Making
of Fourth Amendment Law,
0 2002 Sam Krnin 2
It is something of a truism in criminal procedure (as elsewhere in constitutional law) that
unless the conduct of a government agent is involved, the Constitution is not implicated.3
Thus, if a Federal Express employee acting on her own
initiative opens a shipped package that turns out to
contain drugs and then gives these drugs to law
enforcement, no search has occurred. 4 Similarly, if a
hotel manager searches the room of a guest and then
turns over any contraband he finds to the government, no
search has occuned. 5 So long as the private citizen is
acting as such and not at the direction or encouragement
of law enforcement, 6 the government is free to use the
discovered material without concern for its exclusion at
trial.7 To the extent that actions by private actors ever
find their way into our consideration of criminal
procedure, it is generally to prove this point: only the
government and its agents can be found to have violated
the Fourth Amendment.
In this essay, I argue that this focus on state action has
distracted both scholars and practitioners from an
important point: the interrelationship between privacy
vis-a-vis private actors and privacy vis-a -vis the
government. while it is trie that the absence of a state
actor means that a Fourth Amendment search has not
been conducted, it does not follow from this fact that
Fourth Amendment doctrine is unaffected by such
invasions of privacy. Quite the contrary: I argue that the
more privacy an individual surrenders to private actors,
the less privacy he will have from the government. The
more we become inured to our neighbors, employers,
creditors, and advertisers having greater and greater
access to areas we think of as private, the more we run
the risk that the government will have unfettered access
to them as well.
The principal basis for this argument is the Supreme
Court's decision in Katz v. United States8 and the line of
precedent that it has spawned. In Katz, the Supreme
Court stated that a search occurs and the Fourth
Amendment is implicated whenever the government
invades an area in which an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy? The Court held that whether an
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individual is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection
depends not on where the search of the object takes
place, but rather on how the individual and society treat
that area. 10 Thus, as the court put it:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection
... [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.1
Instead of asking whether the place searched - in Katz a
public phone booth - is a place entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection in the abstract, the question
became whether the defendant behaved in a way that
demonstrated his subjective belief that the place searched
was entitled to protection, and whether society is willing
to validate that belief as reasonable.
12
On a case-by-case basis over the last thirty-five years,
the contours of the Fourth Amendment tinder Katz have
come into focus. I argue that one thing that has become
very clear is that even things in which one generally has a
very high privacy interest - one's home, one's business
records, etc. - can be searched by the government
without implicating the Fourth Amendment if one has
permitted others to have access to these things. If an
individual has given up a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his property or information by exposing them
to the view of others, he cannot attempt to deny the
government similar access to these areas.
Of course, in these cases one rarely waives an interest
in property or information explicitly. Instead, in a
number of contexts, courts have inferred from a
defendant's actions that he could not have had a privacy
interest in his activities, or that such an interest could not
be reasonable. For example, in California v.
GreenwooCd 3, the Supreme Court held that no search
occurred when police removed trash that Greenwood
had placed by the side of the road for collection. 
14
Without explaining whether Greenwood had
demonstrated that he did not expect his discarded
trash to be kept secret, or whether that expectation
of privacy, even if actually entertained by the
defendant, was not reasonably held, the Court
simply reasoned that there could not be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in something
consciously abandoned. 5  '4
The Court's reasoning was clearly influenced by
the fact that by putting the trash in front of the
house, Greenwood had made it available not just for
sanitation workers but for anyone else who happened by.
The Court stated, "lilt is common knowledge that plastic
garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public."
1 6
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the sanitation workers
themselves, once in possession of the trash, might have
conveyed it to anyone else. 17 Thus, because the police
officers merely did what any other member of the public
could have done - looked through the trash that had
been left out - they did not invade Greenwood's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized to
other, earlier examples of this line of reasoning. For
example, in Smith v. Maryland's the Supreme Court held
that the installation and use of pen registers - devices
that allow law enforcement to access and record all of the
numbers dialed from a particular phone - was not a
search subject to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court held that the installation and use
of these devices (by the phone company at the direction
of law enforcement) was not a search because in the
course of using his phone, the defendant voluntary
conveyed information to the phone company about the
numbers he was dialing.1 9 Thus, Smith knew (or at the
very least should have known) that he was transmitting
this information to a third party, and "a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties. "20 Similarly, in
United States '. Miller trhe Supreme Court ruled that
records held by banks may be subpoenaed without
invoking the Fourth Amendment. The reasohing was the
same: "The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the Government."22 Like Greenwood
putting out her trash, Smith and Miller had essentially
abandoned their privacy interests by allowing others
access to their information.
23
In still other contexts,








-made, she will not
be heard to complain when the government
makes the same invasion. For example, in
continued onpage 553
518 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
II 131Ci0i1o
continuedfrompage 545
The courts recognize a privacy
interest in medical records and then
balance that interest against various
legitimate purposes associated with
disclosing that information.
V. The HIPAA regulations
adopt and seek to implement
the privacy interests and
balancing tests developed in
the various cases.
In 1996, Congress enacted the
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). 13
Among other things, HIPAA required
Congress to enact new safeguards to
protect the security and
confidentiality of health care
information. Congress failed to do so,
requiring the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") to
promulgate regulations for such
protections10 4 In November of 1999,
HHS published proposed regulations
and, during the comment period,
received 52,000 communications
from the public1 0 5 In December
2000, HHS issued the final rule that
took effect on April 14, 2001,106
However, most covered entities have
until April 14, 2003 to comply with
the final rule's provisions.10 7 The
HIPAA regulations are intended to
establish a set of basic national
privacy standards to serve as a floor
of ground rules for health care
providers, health plans and health
care clearinghouses to follow.
108
In promulgating the regulations,
HHS considered the need for privacy
of medical records to be great. 10' The
HHS recognized a "growing concern"
stemming from several trends,
"including the growing use of
interconnected electronic media for
business and personal activities, our
increasing ability to know an
individual's genetic make-up, and, in
health care, the increasing
complexity of the system."" 0) Unless
those public concerns were allayed,
the HHS believed we would be
"unable to obtain the full benefits of
electronic technologies. The absence
of national standards for the
confidentiality of health information
has made the health care industry
and the population in general
uncomfortable about this primarily
financially-driven expansion in the
use of electronic data.""' The HHS
focused on one of the same concerns
that was recognized by various
courts, the consequences of sharing
information without the knowledge
of the patient involved."
12
In concluding that "privacy is a
fundamental right," HHS looked to
judicial authority and, in particular, to
the Whalen decision. 113 In several
aspects, the HIPAA regulations have
followed the guidance from the
federal courts. 114 In relying on this
federal authority, HHS did not
specifically address the fact that the
judicial authority it cited related to
the right to privacy from the
perspective of government actors
rather than the private sector, which
is not subject to the constitutional
restrictions. 1
15
There are several principles from
the federal decisions that are
reflected and expanded in the HIPAA
regulations. First, the cases generally
accept that there is an expectation of
privacy in medical records, although
the extent to which it reaches a
constitutionally protected right may
be debated.116 In promulgating the
regulations, HHS characterized
privacy as a "fundamental right" and
concluded that the "United States
Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutional protection of personal
health information" in Wbalen.
117
Second, the HIPAA regulations focus
on the first type of individual privacy
protection identified in Whalen, the
protection for medical records. 18
The HIPAA regulations do not seek to
protect medical decision-making, an
interest also largely ignored by the
courts.119 Third, the HIPAA
regulations acknowledge that the
right to privacy "is not absolute" and
must be balanced against legitimate
continued onpage 556
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California v. Ciraolo24, the Court held
that an overflight of the defendant's
property by a police airplane did not
amount to a search, on the unusual
ground that the plane was in FAA
approved air space. The Court's
rationale for this rule was that no
expectation of privacy could be
reasonable, as "[alny member of the
public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers
observed."25 Here, the individual's
fault is not conveying information
to a third party, but failing to properly
safeguard his property:
That the area is within the
curtilage does not itself bar
all police observation. The
Fourth Amendment
protection of the home has
never been extended to
require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a hone on
public thoroughfares. Nor
does the mere fact that an
individual has taken
measures to restrict some
views of his activities
preclude an officer's
observations from a public
vantage point where he has a
right to be and which renders
the activities clearly visible.2
6
In its most recent Fourth
Amendment case, Kyllo v. United
States,27 the Court held that the use of
thermal imaging technology to
measure the heat coming off of a
dwelling was a search subject to the
requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court held that
because the device provided details
about the interior of a home that
could not otherwise be obtained
without trespassing into the home
and because the device had not yet
entered into general use, its use
constituted a search. 28 The flip-side of
this argument appears to be that had
the device used by the police
continued onpage 574
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been in regular public use at the time
that it was used to scan Kyllo's home,
Kyllo's failure to take precautions
against the device would be proof of
his lack of a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the heat coming off his
house. Just as Ciraolo's case would
have come out very differently 100
years ago (when airplanes were
unknown) than today, so Kyllo's case
might come out very differently 10
years from now when the use of
thermal imaging technology
becomes better known to the public.
This leads me back to my original
thesis. What all of these cases
demonstrate is that if an individual
has allowed private actors to look
into areas that would otherwise be
private, he has invited the
government in as well. Even if others
were invited in for a narrow and
specific purpose, the individual has
run the risk that her trust will be
abused. Similarly, even if one has
behaved passively, not conveying or
showing information to anyone, but
simply failing to take precautions
against intrusions by others, she has
likely lost an expectation of privacy
in the area she has carelessly
exposed. Furthermore, precautions
that might be sufficient to protect an
expectation of privacy in one era -
for example, protecting the four sides
but not the roof of a shed from public
view - will be deemed insufficient
in another.
This is why I argue that privacy vis-
a-vis private actors is crucial in
defining the contours of Fourth
Amendment law. In recent years,
technological changes have made
surveillance easier, cheaper, and
much more pervasive. For example,
a recent report indicated that more
than one third of the United States
work force is subject to workplace
monitoring of their web use and e-
mails. 29 Microsoft, which makes the
vast majority of the operating systems
in the world, placed code in its
Windows XP operating system that
records the titles of DVDs watched
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on an individual's computer and
transmits this information back to the
company "in a way that allows the
company to match individuals with
their music and movie choices.3°
Night vision goggles, long-distance
microphones, and personal tracking
devices can all be purchased by
members of the public on the
Internet for under $1,000. 31 While it
was once possible to defeat nosy
neighbors, prying employers, or
avaricious marketers simply by
shutting the door and keeping your
voice down, such precautions are
simply insufficient today.
As these examples illustrate and as
many have written, much of this new
surveillance technology has been
adopted not by the government,
32
but by the so-called Little Brothers -
advertisers, employers and other
private snoops, who many argue
pose a greater threat to privacy than
is posed by government's Big
Brother. 33 What has been less
understood, however, is that the
more power the Little Brothers gain,
the more power Big Brother gains.
Every time a Little Brother gains
access to an area previously
forbidden to him, it becomes easier
for Big Brother to later claim that a
defendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy has been lost.
Thus, those of us interested in the
amount of government intervention
into our private lives should be
deeply concerned with the extent to
which others are allowed in. If we
allow our employers to read our e-
mails, we cannot very well complain
when the government does so as
well. If we allow our software
companies to learn what movies we
are watching, we cannot complain
when the government does so as
well. Yet we cannot do anything to
eliminate the technologies that are
making privacy more fleeting;
technological fxes - enciyption,
wiretap blocking, etc. - will only
lead to new and different
technological responses by those
who would invade our privacy. What
is needed is a legal response, one
that makes actionable the use of
technology by private actors to
obtain information that an individual
has taken steps to keep private.
If it is a violation of statute for
private actors to gain access to
information in which an individual
has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, if those whose privacy has
been invaded can bring a private
cause of action akin to trespass
against those who have invaded their
privacy, then privacy can be
preserved even in the face of
technological change. just as the
possibility that private actors might
break into your house and rifle
through your things does not allow
the government to freely break in
and snoop around, so the tortious
privacy invasion of a third party will
not give the government carte
blanche to snoop. So long as third
party privacy invasions violate no
laws, however, they will only
embolden those in government who
seek greater access to private
information and will make it more
difficult for any of us to claim that we
should be protected from
government attempts to get at this
information
The current war against terrorism
has energized civil liberties groups to
respond to governmental attempts to
extend surveillance of citizens and
non-citizens alike. Of course, these
attempts to control the worst
excesses of government are laudable.
But if civil libertarians wait until the
government acts to invade privacy,
they will have lost the battle before it
has even begun.
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